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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the European anti-discrimination 
directives and their transposition in the context of a 
relatively new member state; Lithuania. The post-
enlargement context provides a new testing ground for an 
assessment of the ability of the EU to instigate domestic 
change. Taking this post-communist society as a case 
study, it is suggested that while formal legislative 
compliance has been broadly accomplished as a 
consequence of EU conditionality, structural behavioral 
change has not been achieved. The combination of EU 
pressure on the one hand, and norm incompatibility on 
the other, may result in a normative backlash which 
prevents true behavioral change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been approximately ten years since the so-called 
Big Bang enlargement took place in the European Union 
(EU). By including three former Soviet Republics 
(Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), four former members of 
the Warsaw Pact (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia), a previous member of the Yugoslav Federation 
(Slovenia) and two island states (Cyprus and Malta), the 
EU was no longer a community of exclusively Western 
European states. To be accepted into the EU, these 
candidate countries had to adopt all accumulated 
legislation, legal acts and court decisions of the EU 
(acquis communautaire). The question arises how the 
prospect of EU membership influenced the candidate 
states’ decisions to transpose EU law into their domestic 
legal order, and whether norms and cultural values had an 
impact on the transposition and subsequent 
implementation of EU rules. The post-enlargement 
context provides a promising new testing ground for the 
study of the capability of EU conditionality in securing 
political, economic and legal reforms in Central and 
Eastern Europe.1 This paper will examine to what extent 
the transposition of European directives can be explained 
by the two dominant institutionalist approaches within the 
theory of top-down Europeanization; namely rationalist 
and sociological institutionalism. Whereas the rationalist 
institutionalist approach to the theory of top-down 
Europeanization emphasizes the power of EU 
conditionality in inducing domestic changes in EU 
member states, the sociological institutionalist approach 
emphasizes the importance of norm compatibility and the 
role of societal attitudes. The main research question of 
the paper is the following: “to what extent can the theory 
of top-down Europeanization contribute to our 
understanding of the implementation of  the Council 
2000/43/EC (Racial Equality Directive) and Council 
2000/78/EC (Employment Equality Directive) anti-
discrimination directives in Lithuania?.” 
Lithuania has been selected as a case study. There is little 
literature on the specific case of Lithuania in the context 
of the European anti-discrimination directives and 
Europeanization theory. Although the EU has generated 
various reports on the general transposition of the two 
directives across the EU, specific case studies on 
Lithuania are scarce. One exception is a paper by Charles 
Woolfson (2012), who has studied the transposition of the 
Racial Equality Directive in Lithuania. He concluded that 
five years after transposition, the socio-political context 
continues to be problematic and that “differential” 
Europeanization may be observed in the new member 
states.2 Woolfson, however, does not make an explicit 
link with rational or sociological institutionalism, 
although his work seems to be informed by the 
sociological approach. This paper, in contrast, aims to 
make this link between Lithuania’s transposition of the 
anti-discrimination directives and the theory of top-down 
Europeanization explicit. The top-down perspective to 
Europeanization has been selected rather than the bottom-
up perspective. Lithuania was not yet a member of the 
EU at the time when the Council unanimously agreed 
upon the European anti-discrimination directives in 2000. 
Nevertheless, in order to become a member Lithuania had 
to transpose these anti-discrimination directives into its 
national law as part of the EU acquis communautaire 
conditionality. Given that Lithuania was not involved in 
the negotiations regarding the antidiscrimination 
directives but had to accept them after they had already 
been adopted, a bottom up approach to Europeanization is 
not considered in this paper.  
Both approaches within the theory of top-down 
Europeanization, the rationalist institutionalist approach 
and the sociological institutionalist approach, will be used 
in the explanation for the transposition and 
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 implementation patterns of the anti-discrimination 
directives in Lithuania. Arguably, Lithuania provides a 
least likely case for a norm driven explanation of 
transposition. It is likely that conditionality in the pre-
accession period generates conditions for a logic of 
consequentialism to dominate, encouraging a cost-benefit 
approach to transposition.3 It is however still possible that 
a different logic also had an effect on the transposition of 
the anti-discrimination directives, especially after the first 
formal adoption of the relevant legislation was 
completed. It is expected that a so-called “norm misfit” 
exists in Lithuania between national and European anti-
discrimination norms, especially with regard to 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. In 
examining both approaches, this case study can shed light 
on the two different strands of top-down Europeanization 
and their compatibility.  
The anti-discrimination directives have been selected for 
several reasons. First of all, non-discrimination is a well-
established and important norm of Community law. 
Second, these directives were adopted just before 
Lithuania began its accession negotiations with the EU, 
which makes it possible to assess the explanatory power 
of both institutionalist approaches in two different phases; 
the pre-accession and post-accession phase. This 
distinction makes it possible to assess whether the two 
approaches can take place at the same time or describe 
different phases in a process of adaptational change.  
THEORY & METHODOLOGY  
Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse developed the notion of 
“top-down” Europeanization as a response to early 
European studies, which were mostly concerned with 
explaining European integration and Europeanization 
processes themselves. Börzel and Risse called this a 
‘bottom-up’ perspective on Europeanization.4 To fully 
capture the concept of Europeanization, Börzel and Risse 
developed a ‘top-down’ perspective on Europeanization 
in their influential article “When Europe Hits Home: 
Europeanization and Domestic Change.” This top-down 
perspective  analyzes “the impact of European 
integration and Europeanization on domestic member 
states and social processes of the member States and 
beyond.”5 According to Börzel and Risse, domestic 
change in response to Europeanization is expected under 
two conditions. The first prerequisite is some degree of 
“misfit” between European-level and domestic processes, 
policies and institutions. The degree of misfit encourages 
adaptational pressures: the lower the compatibility 
between European-level and domestic institutions, 
processes and policies; the higher the adaptational 
pressure. The second precondition for domestic change in 
response to Europeanization is that there are some 
“facilitating factors” which respond to the adaptational 
pressures initiated by the misfit. Börzel and Risse go on 
to identify two ways of conceptualizing the adaptational 
pressures in response to Europeanization: a rationalist 
institutionalist approach and a sociological institutionalist 
approach. The two institutionalist approaches to top-
down Europeanization are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive but may occur simultaneously or characterize 
different stages in a process of adaptational change. In 
order asses the contribution of these two approaches in 
explaining the transposition of the European anti-
discrimination directives in Lithuania, two models have 
been identified which form the basis for this case study.  
The starting point for the rationalist institutionalist 
approach is the “external incentives model” as developed 
by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier. Guido 
Schwellnus, Lilla Balázs and Liudmila Mikalayeva 
(2009) have drawn on Schimmelfennig’s framework to 
derive three hypotheses to account for change in formal 
rule adoption: 1] the domestic path hypothesis: positive 
change should occur independently of any external 
incentives if domestic conditions are favorable; 2] the 
external incentives path hypothesis: strong and 
determinate external incentives should induce positive 
change also in cases where domestic conditions are less 
favorable, for instance if large minorities, indifferent or 
even moderately nationalist governments and/or veto 
players exist, as long as they are not ultra-nationalist and 
would incur prohibitively high political adoption costs; 3] 
the revocation hypothesis: negative change should occur 
when external incentives are weak, indeterminate or 
absent and a combination of nationalist government and 
no pro-minority veto player exists.6  
With regard to sociological institutionalism, the starting 
point for analysis is Schimmelfennig’s “social learning 
model.”7 Three hypotheses can be derived from this 
model to account for rule adoption: 1] the likelihood of 
rule adoption increases as the legitimacy of the rules 
increases. 2] the likelihood of rule adoption increases 
with the identification of the target government and 
society with the community that has established the rules. 
3] the likelihood of rule adoption increases with domestic 
resonance. Furthermore, the framework developed by 
Antoaneta Dimitrova and Mark Rhinard (2005), about  
the importance of norms in the transposition of EU 
directives, will be taken into account when dealing with 
the sociological institutionalist approach. According to 
them, norm compatibility shapes how norms will be 
received, and thus how transposition will proceed.8 
LITHUANIA: TRANSPOSITION IN THE PRE-
ACCESSION PERIOD (2000-2004)  
With regard to the pre-accession period, rationalist 
institutionalism can be considered the most dominant 
model for explaining the transposition of the European 
nondiscrimination directives. The conditional rewards 
were certain and high; the rules determinate and precise; 
while domestic political actors had an incentive to 
demonstrate to their electorate that they were complying 
with the EU requirements. Indeed, the promise of EU 
membership can be considered the most effective 
conditionality tool of the European Union. Membership 
of the EU means full access to, inter alia, the internal 
market, EU funding (such as the European Regional 
Development Fund) and the decision-making institutions 
of the EU. Although the EU speaks of accession 
“negotiations,” this suggests an openness that does not 
exist in the accession process, especially in the case of the 
Central and Eastern European States (CEEC’s).9 The 
outcome of accession negotiations is largely 
predetermined, namely the adoption of the entire body of 
EU legislation and policies as codified in the acquis 
communautaire (consisting of approximately 80.000 
pages of EU legislation). Unlike existing Member States, 
applicants are unable to negotiate opt-outs. Moreover, in 
the accession negotiations with the CEECs the conditions 
for accession were the most detailed and comprehensive 
ever formulated.10 This strict conditionality allowed the 
EU an unprecedented influence in restructuring domestic 
institutions and public policies in the CEECs.   
Nevertheless, the social learning model can also explain 
some aspects. It was not until the accession “endgame” 
that transposition occurred in Lithuania.11 This can partly 
be explained by the low resonance of some of the 
European norms, especially the sexual orientation norm. 
The EU directives were  only transposed when the 
accession date drew closer. The fact that Lithuanians 
strongly identified themselves with “Europeans” in the 
pre-accession period and the wish to “return to Europe” 
helped the Lithuanian government to pass the necessary 
legislation. Moreover, the details of the legal changes 
were not widely discussed, since Lithuanian identification 
with the European Union was based on emotional and 
ideological assessments, rather than on the basis of clear 
policies whose impact was understood by the Lithuanian 
public.12 
LITHUANIA: COMPLIANCE IN THE POST-ACCESSION 
PERIOD (2005-2014) 
Although Lithuania transposed the European anti-
discrimination directives through a unified and 
comprehensive national law, Lithuania did not meet all 
European requirements with regard to the anti-
discrimination directives. The European Commission 
acknowledged these failures and opened an infringement 
case against Lithuania, after which the Lithuanian 
government amended the “Law on Equal Treatment” to 
the satisfaction of the European Commission. Explained 
from a rationalist institutionalist perspective, the EU 
continues to have sufficient leverage over its Member 
States after accession and is able to compel the Member 
States to comply with European obligations, even when 
there are nationalist tendencies in the government.  
Nevertheless, formal compliance of Lithuania did not 
extend to de facto compliance. Problems such as a lack of 
effective application of the existing legal instruments and 
passive social attitudes, continued to persist.13 The 
sociological approach is able to explain the lack of 
behavioral change. Although the EU aimed to achieve 
behavioral compliance with the directives, norm 
socialization has not occurred in Lithuania. To the 
contrary, attitudes both amongst the society at large and 
the Lithuanian elite with regard to sexual minorities have 
hardened. After Lithuania obtained EU membership, 
public discourse changed: the labels “Lithuanian” and 
“European” are no longer presumed to be complementary 
and the economic crisis has further diminished support 
for the European project. The provisions of 
nondiscrimination and equal opportunities for sexual 
minorities are perceived to be “imposed” by the European 
Union.14 This feeling is further exacerbated by the fact 
that local LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender people) advocacy NGO’s in Lithuania 
receive vital European support. Moreover, the EU 
provides these local organizations with new opportunities 
to challenge domestic authorities. For instance, on 
October 25th 2014, the Lithuanian Gay League, in 
collaboration with ILGA-Europe (the European Region of 
the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and 
Intersex Association), appealed to the European 
Commission using the EU infringement procedure, 
claiming that the Lithuanian government has breached 
European rules and disproportionately limited the right of 
LGBT-people to freedom of speech and expression. This 
challenge to Lithuanian authorities by a local NGO 
through the institutions and processes of the European 
Union may feed the perception in Lithuania that the 
European Union “imposes” policies on Lithuania. This 
perception of EU interference has resulted in a normative 
backlash. For instance, in 2009, the “Law on the 
Protection of Minors against the Detrimental Effects of 
Public Information,” which effectively prohibits 
information on same-sex relationships, was adopted by 
the Lithuanian Parliament with two-thirds of the 
Members of Parliament voting in favor of the bill. More 
anti-gay bills have been proposed since then which are 
still under consideration at the time of writing. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper aimed to explore to what extent the two 
strands of top-down Europeanization theory can 
contribute to our understanding of the implementation of  
the Council 2000/43/EC and Council 2000/78/EC anti-
discrimination directives in Lithuania. The rationalist 
institutionalist model can be considered the most 
dominant model for explaining the initial transposition of 
the European nondiscrimination directives in Lithuania. 
In the pre-accession period the prospect of European 
Union membership acted as a decisive conditionality 
mechanism: the rules of conditionality were determinate 
and precise and the benefits associated with EU 
membership were considered to be particularly high. The 
revocation hypothesis of the rational institutionalists, 
which states that negative change should occur when 
external incentives are weak, indeterminate or absent and 
a combination of nationalist government and no pro-
minority veto player exists,  is also able to explain certain 
developments in the post-accession period. After the 
incentive of EU membership was no longer relevant, the 
EU proved to continue to have considerable leverage over 
Lithuania: the EU was able to force the Member State, 
despite nationalistic tendencies and domestic opposition, 
to comply with European obligations through the 
initiation of an infringement procedure. 
The social learning model however, also explains certain 
aspects of Lithuania’s transposition and implementation 
patters. The norm of sexual orientation did not resonate 
with domestic attitudes. The “endgame” transposition of 
the European directives can partly be explained by this 
lack of norm resonance. However, the high level of 
identification with the European Union helped the 
Lithuanian government to pass the necessary legislation, 
as did the fact that the legal changes were not widely 
 discussed with society. EU membership was presented to 
Lithuanians as a broad question of national orientation, 
referring to emotional assessments such as the “going 
back to Europe” argument. In the post-accession period, 
the importance of norm compatibility and domestic 
support became particularly apparent. Indeed, the 
importance of socialization in supporting the process of 
legal change should not be underestimated. Although 
external incentives may initially drive legal changes in 
candidate countries, this does not necessarily mean that 
the legal changes are supported by successful 
socialization into European norms. This was evident in 
the case of the antidiscrimination directives in Lithuania, 
especially with regard to the ground of sexual orientation 
and, to a lesser extent, the ground of race or ethnicity. 
Formal compliance of Lithuania did not extent to de facto 
compliance in some areas. It has been argued that both 
European directives are still not covered in their entirety 
in Lithuanian law. Problems such as a lack of effective 
application of the existing legal instruments, insufficient 
competence of judicial institutions and passive social 
attitudes, continues to persist. Rather than achieving norm 
socialization and securing better protection for minorities, 
the European directives seem to have generated a 
normative backlash. After gaining EU membership, 
Lithuanian public discourse with regard to the European 
Union changed. Politicians increasingly started to claim 
that the “liberal European agenda” was threatening 
“traditional Lithuanian values,” and this conflict between 
values became particularly visible in the attitudes against 
sexual minorities, which deteriorated since the 
transposition of the European directives. This normative 
backlash can be explained by the EU conditionality 
mechanism: because Lithuania was confronted with 
massive pressure by the EU to adopt liberal gay 
legislation long before society appeared to be ready for it, 
the provisions of nondiscrimination on the ground of 
sexual orientation are perceived to be “imposed” by the 
European Union. This feeling is further exacerbated by 
the fact that local LGBT NGO’s in Lithuania receive 
significant European support. The incompatibility of 
norms and lack of domestic support caused a normative 
backlash against sexual minorities, rather than norm 
socialization which the EU aimed to achieve.   
Thus, although in the pre-accession period the EU is able 
to pressure potential member states to adopt European 
rules and continues to have significant leverage in the 
post-accession phase even when domestic conditions are 
less favorable, in the long term, norm compatibility 
between national and EU norms is crucial for proper 
implementation and compliance. EU pressure to adopt 
certain legislation despite a lack of popular domestic 
support is likely to result in a normative backlash. The 
EU’s impact on (prospective) Member States depends not 
only on external incentives and supportive governments, 
but also on popular domestic support.  
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